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Summary
This paper outlines some of the implications of factor market integration for scal
policy in the countries of the EU and for the EU itself. It draws particular attention to the
dynamic dimensions of factor market integration, and identies some of the many issues
for further research on these topics.
The past century has seen dramatic growth in the role of the public sector in the
countries of Western Europe, both by extensive regulatory as well as scal interventions.
By far the most important reason for the growth of public spending has been the increase
in the level of redistributive (or social insurance) activities of governments. These include
public pension systems and health care programs as well as a host of other policies. Tax
policies also have the eect of redistributing income among dierent groups.
European economic integration, including prospective enlargement of the EU, con-
tributes to the freer movement of factors of production, such as labor and capital, both
within the EU and between the EU and neighboring regions. Integration of factor mar-
kets aects the distribution of income and factor movements depend on scal incentives,
aecting the benets and costs of redistributive policies.
The paper begins by recapitulating some of the basic principles that have emerged from
the existing literature on scal competition. It then describes recent trends in international
migration and capital movements. The evidence suggests that the countries of Europe are
experiencing inter-regional movements of labor and capital of signicant magnitude, but
that these movements are far from instantaneous. Labor and capital markets are clearly
linked across regions, but there appear to be obstacles to very rapid adjustments of labor
and capital stocks, suggesting that labor and capital are mobile but imperfectly so.
The analysis of factor mobility with explicit dynamics thus oers promise. Dierent
types of \stock adjustment" models of labor and capital mobility have important implica-
tions for the analysis of the distributional and allocative eects of scal policy. A formal
analysis of scal competition with integrated capital markets and explicit costs of adjust-
ment for the capital stock shows that sluggish capital adjustment creates incentives for
governments to use tax policy to capture quasi-rents for their residents, even if it is im-
possible for any one government to impose net scal burdens on capital that is perfectly
mobile in the long run.
Factor Mobility and Fiscal Policy in the EU:
Policy Issues and Analytical Approaches
I. Introduction
The past century has seen dramatic growth in the role of the public sector in the
countries of Western Europe, both by extensive regulatory as well as scal interventions.
In the scal sphere, the EU countries in recent decades have maintained public expenditures
and revenues at roughly half of GDP. These expenditures partly nance the provision of
classic public goods like national defense and this century has seen episodes { hopefully
not to be repeated in the next { where a large share of public-sector spending has been
devoted to defense and national security generally. But by far the most important reason
for the growth of public spending has been the increase in the level of redistributive (or
social insurance) activities of governments. These include public pension systems and
health care programs whose benets largely accrue to the old and that entail substantial
intergenerational as well as intragenerational transfers. They also involve a host of other
transfers: from the employed to the unemployed, toward the less-skilled, toward students,
toward families with children, toward farmers, toward workers in specic industrial sectors
such as shipbuilding or coal-mining, toward people or businesses in poor regions, and many
others.
On the tax side, public expenditures have been nanced by consumption taxes, payroll
taxes, taxes on personal income, and taxes on business income, implying that the burden
of public expenditures broadly falls more heavily on households with higher levels of con-
sumption, income, and wealth. But of course the tax systems of Western Europe also fall
unevenly on dierent types of households and businesses because of explicit and implicit
distinctions between dierent types of income, consumption, and wealth and because of
uneven levels of enforcement, administration, and evasion. All of these features of the rev-
enue system of Western Europe themselves entail intentional or accidental redistribution
of income, as well.
No simple generalization can accurately characterize such a vast system of public-
sector policies. But it is fair to say that they reect the outcome of a democratic policy
making process that has not been prepared to accept the market-determined distribution
of income in an unaltered form. The market-determined distribution of income, of course,
reects essentially the distribution of endowments and factor prices, and, even in a static
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world, would exhibit inequality attributable to dierences in ability, health, and other
personal characteristics. Of course, the world and the distributed income are not static.
The distribution of wealth, though xed at any one moment, evolves over time as a result
of household consumption, saving, and bequest behavior, and the distribution of income
also evolves accordingly. Moreover, factor prices change continually { and often somewhat
unexpectedly { due to technological change, demographic change, changes in demand, and
associated changes in domestic and world product prices. Just to provide one illustration,
returns to labor and capital in the agricultural sector in North America and Western
Europe have failed to keep pace with returns elsewhere in the economy, leading to a
century-long decline in the share of labor and capital allocated to this sector. This long-
term shift can obviously be attributed in large part to technological change and also to
world demographic shifts. It is noteworthy that this long-term shift has been accompanied
by scal and regulatory policy eorts both in North America and in Europe that have
had the eect of protecting the returns to resources in the agricultural sector. In addition
to distributional consequences, of course, these policies, like many redistribution policies,
have also interfered with ecient resource allocation by dulling the incentives for scarce
resources to ow from less-productive to more-productive uses.
Changes in economic policy that directly or indirectly aect factor markets and factor
prices obviously aect the distribution of income, sometimes in intended directions and
sometimes not. The process of European economic integration { part but not all of which is
the result of explicit steps toward liberalization of markets undertaken under the auspices
of the EU { is bound to have important eects on factor markets and the distribution
of income. In particular, integration of factor markets themselves aects factor prices
directly. In addition, factor mobility aects the scal systems of countries that experience
increases or decreases in population and labor forces and in the stock of capital.
This paper attempts to outline some of the implications of factor market integration
for scal policy in the countries of the EU and for the EU itself. It draws particular
attention to the dynamic dimensions of factor market integration, and identies some of
the many issues for further research on these topics.
The paper begins, in Section II, with a concise recapitulation of some principles that
have emerged from existing literature on scal competition. For the most part, this lit-
erature has tended to rely on somewhat stylized analytical frameworks built on polar
assumptions about factor mobility. This analytical approach exposes fundamental issues
in a transparent fashion, but strong simplifying assumptions can also be misleading. Sec-
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tion III describes recent trends in international migration and capital movements. The
evidence suggests that the countries of Europe are experiencing inter-regional movements
of labor and capital of signicant magnitude, but that these movements are far from in-
stantaneous. Labor and capital are clearly linked across regions, but there appear to be
obstacles to very rapid adjustments of labor and capital stocks, suggesting that labor and
capital are mobile but imperfectly so.
In view of the evidence on labor and capital mobility, analyses of factor mobility
with explicit dynamics oer promise. Section IV discusses \stock adjustment" models of
labor and capital mobility and their implications for the analysis of the distributional and
allocative eects of scal policy. The discussion in Section IV draws on a formal analysis
developed in the Appendix. Section V concludes with a discussion of some of the important
policy issues that EU countries seem likely to face during coming decades.
II. Redistributive Policy with Factor Mobility: Atemporal Models
Much of the economic analysis of scal competition has focused on polar cases in
which factors of production are assumed either to be completely immobile or costlessly
mobile. Even though analyses based on stylized assumptions can be criticized for lack of
realism, the study of polar cases is nevertheless quite helpful in obtaining clear insights
into complex issues, providing important benchmarks and reference points.
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The simplest way to begin the exploration of the implications of factor market inte-
gration is to suppose that a previously-immobile factor of production becomes costlessly
mobile among a large number of small jurisdictions. The assumption of \small open"
jurisdictions means that the factor of production is available to each jurisdiction at an
externally-xed net rate of return. As examples, one might imagine that a small locality
within a large country, such as a single local school district within the United States or a
1
There is a now large and rapidly-growing literature on scal competition. For the sake
of brevity, the present discussion omits many important ideas in to be found in this liter-
ature. For more thorough surveys focusing on scal competition and redistribution, with
many additional references, see Cremer et al. (1996) and Wildasin (1998). The eciency
implications of scal competition are also critically important; see Oates (forthcoming) for
discussion and references. For simplicity, the present discussion focuses almost entirely on
the interplay between redistributive policy and factor mobility, rather than on the more
classical margins of behavioral adjustment to scal policy such as labor-leisure tradeos.
For a recent analytical survey of redistributive policy that addresses these and other issues,
see Boadway and Keen (forthcoming).
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single small town in Germany, suddenly faces an innitely-elastic supply of capital.
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If capital were perfectly immobile, a local source-based local capital tax, such as a
property tax or a corporation income tax, would reduce the net rate of return to capital by
the amount of the tax. By contrast, when capital is costlessly mobile, local taxes cannot
signicantly reduce the net return to capital within the locality.
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Despite the mobility of capital, it remains feasible for the locality to impose such a tax
and to use the revenue to provide public goods and services to its residents, or even simply
to transfer cash to them. However, whereas this policy would make the beneciaries of
local public services better o at the expense of local capital owners if capital were xed
in supply, this is no longer the case when capital can adjust freely. Rather, the imposition
of the local tax will drive capital out of the locality until its before-tax rate of return is
suciently high to compensate capital owners for local taxes. The outow of capital from
the locality must reduce the gross return to labor. Because the local capital tax distorts the
allocation of capital { in equilibrium, it will now be more productive in this locality than its
opportunity cost to the locality, i.e., than the external net rate of return { the loss of income
to local workers will exceed the value of the tax revenue collected from capital taxation.
Except to the degree that public expenditures have a greater value to local residents than
the tax revenue used to nance them, this policy ends up lowering the welfare of local
residents.
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In other words, a small open locality can engage in redistributive policies in
2
The case of the small open locality facing a perfectly-elastic supply of capital might
be described as the \canonical" model of tax competition. For a recent survey of the
literature on this subject, see Wilson (forthcoming).
3
It is tempting but inaccurate to say that capital does not bear the burden of the local
tax. As shown by Bradford (1978), building on the insights of H.G. Brown (1938), while
the local tax only reduces the net return to capital by a very small amount, the reduction
in the net return falls on the worldwide stock of capital. The loss in real income for capital
owners worldwide is of the same order of magnitude as the local tax. For more discussion,
see Wildasin (1986, 107{108).
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The provision of public goods and services { such as education, health, public safety,
or transportation { is sometimes not viewed as part of redistributive policy, on the grounds
that the public sector is performing an eciency-enhancing allocative function in the face
of some sort of market failure. To the extent that this is true, the value of inframarginal
and possibly marginal public goods and services may exceed their cost. Nevertheless, if the
cost is borne by agents other than those who obtain the benets of the public goods, the
combined operation of the tax and expenditure system achieves what amounts to an in-kind
redistributive transfer from taxpayers to the beneciaries of public services. Most of the
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which it imposes scal burdens on a mobile factor of production, but its incentive to do
so is limited or completely negated by the harm that this does to local residents. This is
in striking contrast to the eect of the same policy when the taxed factor of production is
completely immobile.
To generalize this simple model slightly, suppose that there are several costlessly-
mobile factors of production. For example, one might imagine that the local production
process uses capital k, highly-skilled labor h, and unskilled labor, and that both capital
and highly-skilled labor are costlessly mobile among jurisdictions. Let f(k; h) denote the
value of local production in a single jurisdiction, where f is strictly increasing in both
arguments and strictly concave { the strict concavity reecting diminishing returns to
low-skilled labor as it is combined with larger amounts of capital and highly-skilled labor.
Let r and w
h
denote the net incomes that owners of capital and highly-skilled labor can
earn outside of the locality, and let 
k
and 
h
represent the net tax burdens imposed by
the locality on each of these factors, each expressed for convenience on a per-unit basis.
Assuming competitive factor markets, it follows that
f
k
(k; h)  
k
= r (1:1)
f
h
(k; h)   
h
= w
h
(1:2)
in equilibrium. Assuming that the net revenue collected from taxation of capital and
highly-skilled labor accrues to unskilled workers either in the form of cash redistributive
transfers or in the form of public goods and services of equal value, the net income of
unskilled workers will be
x = f(k; h)   f
k
(k; h)k   f
h
(k; h)h+ r

k + 
k
k + 
h
h (2)
where r

k represents the return to any capital with which the local unskilled workers may
initially be endowed.
Although this model allows for two mobile factors of production rather than just one,
its implications are essentially the same as the simpler model previously described. In
discussion in this paper assumes that public expenditures provide benets to beneciaries
that are equal to the level of public spending itself; this would be precisely accurate in the
case of pure cash redistributive transfers. To the extent that public expenditures are used
in ways that produce benets that either exceed or fall short of their costs, this assumption
should be viewed simply as a rst approximation. The reader can easily see how the results
would change under alternative assumptions.
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particular, it is straightforward to show that the welfare of the local unskilled workers, as
measured by their net income x, is maximized by setting 
k
= 
h
= 0. While it would be
possible for the locality to raise revenue by taxing capital and highly-skilled workers, the
net eect of such a policy is to harm immobile, unskilled workers.
To interpret the ndings of this simple analysis, note that the scal instruments 
k
and

h
reect the net impact of all taxes and benets that are borne by or that accrue to capital
and skilled labor, respectively, contingent on their location within the locality. Thus,
for example, 
h
would include local income taxes, local payroll taxes (whether assessed
against highly-skilled workers or their employers), and local consumption taxes (taxes on
retail sales or value-added, local excises) paid by highly-skilled residents of the locality.
As discussed earlier, source-based local taxes on capital or capital income enter into 
k
.
But residence-based local taxes on capital income { for instance, personal income taxes
on dividends, interest, and capital gains { would be part of 
h
, as highly-skilled workers
who reside within the locality are taxed on their non-wage income. It is thus interesting to
note that residence-based taxation of capital income can distort the spatial allocation of
labor; moreover, it is the average rather than the marginal tax rate on capital income that
aects household locational incentives.
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On the expenditure side of local scal policy {
cash transfers and subsidies plus the monetized value of local public goods and services {
the benets that accrue to capital and to skilled labor enter negatively into their respective
tax rates.
Tax and expenditure policies that help unskilled workers when capital and highly-
skilled labor are immobile harm them when these factors are mobile. On the basis of this
5
Residence-based taxation of capital income is especially likely to aect the locational
choices of high-income households, for whom non-wage income is particularly important.
Just to illustrate this well-known empirical regularity with reference to the US, for the
approximately 5% of US taxpayers with the highest levels of adjusted gross income in
1997, wage and salary income only amounted to approximately 57% of total AGI, whereas
the comparable gure for taxpayers with average AGI levels was 83% (Hollenbeck and
Kahr, 1998-1999). (Note that since these gures are based on the incomes of taxpayers
as reported for tax purposes, they already reect the fact that much non-wage income
is sheltered from taxation.) These top-bracket taxpayers had an average level of taxable
dividend, interest, and capital gains income of approximately $21,000. Residence in a
locality that taxes this income thus entails an annual stream of tax liabilities of about
$200 per percentage point of the average tax rate. Discounting at 5%, then, a permanent
move between localities whose average tax rates dier by 10% would thus result in a wealth
gain or loss of about $40,000. See Wildasin (1993) for discussion of interstate dierences
in average tax burdens in the US and their implications for migration incentives.
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analysis, then, one might expect that an increase in the mobility of capital and highly-
skilled labor would lead to some restructuring of local scal policy in ways that would
move 
k
and 
h
closer to zero. Reforms of the revenue system, such as reductions in the
progressivity of the personal income tax, reductions in corporation income tax rates, or
increased reliance on user fees and charges could be part of this restructuring. Privatization
of public enterprises removes the expenditures and revenues of these activities from the
public-sector accounts, implying a reduction in redistributive transfers through regulated
prices that embody cross-subsidization among consumers and through net scal transfers
to loss-making enterprises. On the expenditure side, reductions in means-tested cash and
in-kind transfers, increases in the provision of infrastructure that enhances the return to
private capital, and increases in public services value by highly-skilled workers would also
reduce the eective scal burdens on mobile resources. Note that the analysis certainly
does not suggest that all scal adjustment occurs solely on the tax side of the public-sector
accounts; thus it is more appropriate to characterize scal adjustment to factor mobility
as scal competition rather than as tax competition.
To vary the analysis slightly, suppose that both skilled and unskilled labor as well
as capital are initially immobile, and that the local government imposes taxes on capital
(
k
> 0) in order to provide transfers or public services to skilled labor (
h
< 0). As an
example, one might think of using corporation income tax revenues to help nance higher
education, a service that is disproportionately benecial to skilled (or soon-to-be-skilled!)
workers. Suppose that unskilled workers are neither net scal contributors nor net scal
beneciaries, paying taxes just equal to the value of public services provided on their
behalf. Thus, suppose that the local scal policy satises

k
k + 
h
h = 0; (3)
i.e., it is purely redistributive between capital and skilled labor. When these factors of
production are immobile, this policy reduces the net income of local capital owners and
raises the net income of skilled workers. If, on the other hand, both of these factors are
freely mobile, the policy can no longer benet the latter at the expense of the former, since
their net incomes are xed externally to the locality. Rather, the impact of the policy
now is to reduce the net incomes of unskilled workers. To see this, one can use (3) to
eliminate 
h
in terms of 
k
(assuming that the locality has not chosen tax rates in excess
of those that maximize total tax revenue). Using (1) and (2), one can then calculate that
x = f(k; h)  rk w
h
h+ r

k and hence (letting d()=dt
k
denote a total derivative, including
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all general-equilibrium adjustments)
dx
dt
k
= (f
k
(k; h)  r)
dk
dt
k
+ (f
h
(k; h)  w
h
)
dh
dt
k
= t
k
dk
dt
k
+ t
h
dh
dt
k
< 0; (4)
where the inequality follows from the assumption that t
k
> 0 > t
h
and from the fact that
dk=dt
k
< 0 < dh=dt
k
.
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Thus, whereas unskilled workers were \innocent bystanders" who
were completely unaected by the locality's redistributive policy when both capital and
skilled labor were immobile, they are now left \holding the bag," suering reductions in
net income from redistributive policies in which they themselves do not directly participate
either as contributors or as beneciaries.
The consideration of these simple models, based on extreme polar assumptions, shows
that integration of factor markets { represented here by the free mobility of previously-
immobile factors of production { can have signicant implications for redistributive scal
policies. By opening up locational choice as a new margin of behavioral response, factor
market integration can dramatically change the distributional eects of scal policy. In
addition, increased factor mobility implies that scal policies entail new types of allocative
ineciencies. This is of critical importance not only for normative policy evaluation, but
for understanding the political economy of scal policy.
III. Factor Mobility: Some Recent International Trends
While simple models based on polar assumptions oer great analytical advantages,
they may also be misleading. In the context of European integration, it is dicult to
justify a priori characterizations of capital and labor mobility in terms of extreme polar
assumptions. With respect to labor mobility, language and cultural barriers are obviously
important impediments to movement among some countries; by the same token, it is
obvious that these impediments are not prohibitively high. Moreover, while the European
countries do present non-trivial barriers to migrants from the rest of the world, migration
between Europe and the rest of the world certainly does exist. The movement of nancial
capital among nancial centers now entails only minimal intrinsic costs, but there remain
important regulatory barriers to integration of nancial markets. Furthermore, foregin
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To verify this last inequality, solve (1) implicitly for (k; h) as functions of (t
k
; t
h
). The
inequality now follows from the strict concavity of f(k; h) and from (3).
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direct investment, the relocation of business enterprise, and the establishment of productive
capacity in new locations is neither costless nor probitively costly.
A look at recent trends may be useful, taking the US case as a benchmark for com-
parison with European countries. To begin with, consider capital mobility. Gross ows of
nancial capital are of immense magnitude; many of these ows represent osetting move-
ments through which nancial and other institutions achieve portfolio diversication and
protection against exchange rate and other nancial risks.
7
Net foreign investment ows
are substantially smaller than gross nancial ows, and, both for the US and for EU coun-
tries, normally amount to less than 5% of GDP. FDI ows are signicantly smaller still:
in 1996, inward foreign direct investment in the US was 1.15% of GDP, as compared with
.85% of GDP in 1986. By comparison, inward FDI for the largest EU countries (France,
Germany, Italy, and the UK) amounted to about 2% of GDP in 1996, as compared with
around .9% of GDP in 1986, with substantial variation among countries. Outward FDI
for the US in 1996 was 1.16% as compared with a gure of .42% in 1986; for the largest
EU countries, the corresponding gures are about 1.8% for 1996 and 1.3% for 1986, again
with substantial variation among countries. These gures suggest that FDI seems to be
at least as important in the EU countries as for the US; they also indicate that net ows
of FDI are far smaller than gross ows.
As for labor mobility, international comparisons are made somewhat dicult because
of dierent systems for dening and measuring migration. Perhaps the most important
distinction is between \foreign" population, i.e., residents who are non-citizens, and the
\foreign-born", i.e., those born in other countries, irrespective of current citizenship sta-
tus. In many of the countries using the former classication, which includes many EU
countries, people eectively lose their immigrant status in population records once they
acquire citizenship, which, in some countries, is relatively easily obtained.
8
In addition,
of course, the measurement of illegal immigration is highly problematic. (See Chiswick,
7
In the US in 1991, net nancial investment from abroad was approximately $90 billion
(1.5% of GDP), while net nancial liabilities grew by about $38 billion (.6% of GDP), for
a net nancial inow of $52 billion (.8% of GDP). (See Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, 1999.) For 1998, net nancial investment from abroad was approximately
$511 billion (6% of GDP), net nancial liabilities rose by $274 billion (3.2% of GDP),
and $237 billion (2.7%). The growth of these ows in relation to GDP is particularly
noteworthy. Comparable data for the EU would reveal analogous increases in international
nancial ows.
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In France, in particular, approximately 100,000 people per year have acquired citizen-
ship in recent years.
9
1988, for discussion of illegal immigration and immigration policy.)
Nevertheless, broad characterizations of migration trends are possible. First, in the
US, 9.3% of the population in 1996 was foreign-born, as compared to 6.2% in 1986. The
\foreign" population in the US is not available on an annual basis, but, as of the 1990
decennial census, it amounted to 4.7% of the population; in that year, 7.9% of the US
population was foreign-born.
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For France, the foreign population in 1996 was 6.3% of
the total, down slightly from the 1986 gure
10
of 6.8%; for Germany, the 1996 gure is
8.9%, up from the 1986 gure of 7.4%; for the UK, 3.4% of the 1996 population consisted
of foreigners as against 3.2% in 1986. Of the large EU countries, Italy has the smallest
share of foreign population, at 2.0% in 1996, up from .8% in 1986. These statistics, as
well as those for smaller EU countries, suggest that immigrant populations for the more
auent EU countries are quite comparable in size to that in the US, and are smaller for
the less-auent. Within the EU countries, a substantial minority of the foreign population
is drawn from other EU countries (a share of one-third is perhaps representative), but the
majority of foreigners are from non-EU countries.
For the US, annual inows of immigrants have varied in the range .6{1.8 million in the
past decade; for Germany, the EU country that has experienced the largest recent levels
of immigration, gross annual inows have uctuated in the range .6{1.2 million during the
same period, with net immigration of .1{.6 million. It is striking that Germany, with a
population only one-third of that of the US, has experienced absolute levels of immigra-
tion not much below those for the US. Data on population outows are not available for
many countries, but, where data are available, they indicate that gross inows into EU
countries substantially exceed net inows; for example, net inows in 1995, expressed as
a proportion of gross inows, amounted to 28% for Germany 37% for Belgium, 67% for
the Netherlands, and 57% for Sweden. Figures for migration among major census regions
of the US show, similarly, that gross migration ows among regions greatly exceed the
9
These and the following statistics are ocial OECD data (OECD, 1998). Measure-
ment of illegal immigration is obviously highly problematic, but is conjectured to be quite
important both in the US and in the EU countries.
10
The 1996 gure for France would be approximately 7.3% if one adds to the stock of
foreigners just those people who acquired citizenship during the period 1988{1996.
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amount of net migration.
As is well known, fertility rates and rates of population growth have fallen substantially
in the postwar period both in the US and in the EU countries. Rates of natural increase
have declined and in some cases { notably Germany and Italy { have actually turned
negative. In the US, natural increase still accounts for most population growth, but,
for the past decade, immigration has been larger than natural increase as a source of
population growth in the EU countries. It is fair to say, then, that migration has become
a major determinant of population and labor-force trends both in North America and in
the EU countries, but especially so for the latter.
In summary, the ows of capital and labor to which EU countries are increasingly
exposed suggest that factor mobility is empirically important in these countries, and that
it needs to be taken seriously in the evaluation of scal policy. Especially in view of the
magnitudes of gross factor ows, it would be dicult to accept the stylized assertions
that \labor is immobile" or \capital is immobile" in the EU context. Particularly when
one contemplates the gradual evolution of the scal and other institutions of the modern
welfare state over a period of several decades, it is obvious that the cumulative impact of
sustained movements of labor and capital can be very substantial indeed. By the same
token, international ows of labor and capital, espeicially net ows are suciently small
that it is equally dicult to accept the stylized assertions that \labor is perfectly mobile"
or \capital is perfectly mobile" in the EU context. Rather, it seems that some intermediate
characterization of labor and capital mobility is most appropriate.
IV. Factor Mobility and Fiscal Competition in a Dynamic Context
In considering how to extend the analysis of scal policy to take imperfect factor mo-
bility into account, it is useful to recognize that the stock and composition of productive
human and non-human capital within a region depends on a host of economic and demo-
graphic factors aside from interregional factor ows. Fertility, mortality, health, education,
and retirement behavior all aect the size of the eective labor force over time. The stock
of non-human capital is subject to gradual deterioration over time; ows of replacement,
maintenance, and net investment can preserve and augment the stock of non-human cap-
ital. Many types of economic behavior and economic policy within a region aect the
evolution of the stocks of human and non-human capital. A region that is open to factor
ows has additional margins of adjustment. Like other forms of dynamic adjustment of
these stocks, the migration of labor and the ow of capital across regional boundaries is
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not instantaneous, but rather proceeds at a rate that reects economic incentives, intrinsic
costs of adjustment, and economic policy and institutions.
These considerations suggest that scal competition in a world of imperfect factor
mobility may best be analyzed in an explicitly dynamic framework. Over time, businesses
within any one locality have to make decisions about whether to replace or maintain ma-
chines, buildings, and other capital assets that gradually depreciate. At any one moment
in time, however, some signicant fraction of the capital stock will be of relatively re-
cent vintage, and immediate relocation of that part of the capital stock would entail the
destruction of a substantial portion of its value. Simiarly, most if not all individuals can
consider changing locations over the course of their lifetimes, but the cost of doing so varies
over the life cycle. Every year, some young soon-to-be workers complete their education
and enter the work force with little or not prior attachment to specic employers; even
younger \workers" are in the process of obtaining skills and education and do not even
have strong attachments to particular types of occupations. These young people also are
either single, have no children, or have very young children. For these and other reasons,
it is relatively easy for them to consider changing locations. As workers age, however,
their attachments to specic occupations, employers, and places tend to deepen, with the
result that turnover and migration rates tend to fall over the life cycle (see. e.g., Topel
(1986, 1991), Topel and Ward (1992)). Thus, at any moment in time, there is a signicant
fraction of the work force for which relocation is relatively costly.
Overlapping Generations
There are several ways to model imperfect mobility of labor and capital in an explicitly
dynamic context. The overlapping-generations model provides one natural framework for
the analysis of labor mobility. In a simple version of that model, households might be
assumed to live for only two periods, the rst of which corresponds to youth and the
second to mid-life and old age. One might then suppose that the degree of mobility of
individual workers declines over the life cycle.
11
In this setting, workers are neither
completely mobile nor completely immobile, but rather dierentially mobile over time.
Fiscal policies that aect workers can then dierentially aect workers of dierent ages, in
a variety of ways.
11
For recent analyses that utilize this type of framework, and additional references, see
Wildasin and Wilson (1996), Konrad (1997), and Leers et al. (1999).
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For example, suppose that a local government imposes a general tax on wage incomes.
If young workers are highly mobile, this tax may discourage entry into the locality and the
before-tax wages of young workers will rise to compensate them for the burden of local
scal policy. If young workers are perfectly substitutable for older workers, the mobility
of the former insulates the latter, as well, from the burden of a wage tax. If, on the other
hand, young and old workers are not perfect substitutes, the intergenerational impact of
an earnings tax may be quite dierent. For example, suppose that young and old workers
are complementary inputs in the production process. Then a tax on earnings reduces
the productivity and the before-tax wages of older workers by reducing the supply of
young workers. Since the old are relatively immobile, they suer not only the burden of
an earnings tax that they cannot escape, but the added burden of lost productivity and
reduced gross wages.
This example focuses on the impacts of scal policy on young and old workers. Al-
ternatively, one might adapt the overlapping-generations model to distinguish between
workers and retirees. A large portion of \welfare state" scal policy involves intergenera-
tional transfers from those in the working part of the life cycle to those who are retired,
particularly through income and payroll taxes imposed on workers (or their employers)
and the provision of public pensions and health care for retirees. Especially in the EU
countries, the aging of the population is giving rise to increased nancial stress on scal
systems as the population of current beneciaries increases in relation to the population of
current contributors. Some commentators suggest that migration may play an important
role in helping to restore the nancial health of EU public pension systems.
12
What are
the implications of labor mobility for the intergenerational transfer systems of the EU?
First, note that individual workers interact with the scal system in dierent ways
over their life cycles. They are contributors when young but beneciaries when old; in
principle, any one worker could be either a net scal contributor or a net scal beneciary
over the entire life cycle, in present-value terms. Using standard generational accounting
methods (see, e.g., Kotliko (1992)), however, it is clear that young workers are net scal
contributors under existing policies, that is, they pay more into the scal system, in present-
value terms, than the benets that they receive.
12
See, e.g., Strauhaar and Zimmermann (1993) for a general discussion of policy issues
associated with migration in Europe.
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If young workers are perfectly immobile, relocation oers no escape from the burdens
that the scal system imposes on them. If, on the other hand, young workers are freely
mobile, the ability of the scal system of a small country to impose net burdens on them
disappears. Moreover, the potential gains to the elderly from taxing the young are di-
minished. As owners of capital, land, natural resources, and other immobile factors of
production, the old are harmed by scal burdens imposed on mobile workers. The analysis
in part A suggests that the elderly would be harmed, on balance, by scal policies that
impose net scal burdens on young workers. Accordingly, it would be in the interest of the
old to alter scal policies in a way that would undo some of the intergenerational trans-
fers embedded in the existing structure of taxes and transfers.
13
In short, free mobility of
young workers does not in itself imply that existing programs of intergenerational transfers
can eectively redistribute income from young to old workers. On the contrary, mobility of
the young suggests that these programs are more costly and less eective than otherwise.
It should, however, be emphasized that older households in EU countries can still benet
from increased immigration of younger workers. Flows of workers into EU countries from
the rest of the world raises the returns to existing stocks of resources (including not only
commercial and industrial but also residential capital) that are predominantly owned by
older EU residents. Liberalization of migration policies can increase the benets to the old
from higher returns to non-human resources, even if it undermines their ability to extract
resources from the young through scal policies.
An Adjustment-Cost Approach
While a two-period overlapping generations model may provide a natural framework
for describing the dierential mobility of workers in dierent age groups, it shares with
the atemporal modeling approach of part A above the somewhat unattractive \putty-clay"
feature that workers are still sharply characterized either as perfectly mobile or perfectly
immobile, depending on their age. Plausibly, however, the ability or willingness of workers
at various ages to change locations depends not only on their age but on the magnitude
of the scal and other migration incentives that they face. Consider, as an alternative,
the application of standard adjustment-cost models of investment to the problem of factor
mobility.
13
For some rough empirical estimates of the welfare gains from reductions intergenera-
tional transfers in EU countries, see Wildasin (forthcoming).
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Adjustment cost models are now standard tools for the analysis of the investment
behavior of rms. These are explicitly dynamic models in which the ow of output is
assumed to depend on the ow of services from the stock of capital and the ow of labor
services used in the production process. Capital is a stock which is gradually depleted
over time due to depreciation but which can be maintained or increased through a ow of
purchases of new capital. If rms could costlessly adjust their capital stocks in response to
changes in policy or other shocks, investment ows would occur at extremely high rates in
extremely short bursts: rms would simply make their capital stocks adjust instantaneously
to their new desired levels. In practice, however, the process of investment occurs gradually
because it is costly to add, refurbish, or replace plant and equipment. Moreover, the costs
of adjusting the capital stock are likely to rise as the rate of investment rises. While it is
often possible to accelerate the planning and execution of investment projects, doing so
normally entails extra out-of-pocket expense, disruption of existing operations, and other
costs. Increasing adjustment costs provide rms with incentives to maintain a steadier
ow of investment over time, resulting in slower adjustment of the capital stock to new,
desired levels in response to changes in scal policy or other economic conditions.
As spelled out in detail in the Appendix, the adjustment-cost model of investment
can be used to study tax competition in a dynamic setting. Following the traditional
assumptions of tax-competition models, suppose that individual jurisdictions are small
and open with respect to the external capital market, each thus facing a perfectly elastic
supply of capital, and suppose that each can impose a source-based tax on capital located
within its boundaries. In contrast to the traditional models, suppose that the capital stock
within a given jurisdiction entails costs of adjustment that are increasing in the level of
investment.
In this setting, a local source-based tax on capital does result, eventually, in an outow
of capital. In the long run, capital invested within the locality continues to earn the
same net rate of return as elsewhere. Just as in the standard atemporal models of tax
competition, owners of immobile resources are harmed, in the long run, by scal policies
that redistribute resources to immobile factors by taxing capital. However, these long-run
eects do not materialize instanteously when there are adjustment costs. In the short run,
the local capital stock adjusts very little in response to a tax increase because it is too
costly for capital owners to make a rapid adjustment. As a result, a tax on the returns to
local capital does actually harm capital owners, and can be used to raise the net incomes
of local labor or other immobile factors of production.
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In this model of explicit dynamic adjustment, it is not correct to describe capital
either as \perfectly mobile" or as \perfectly immobile." In fact, the adjustment-cost model
eectively includes these polar opposites of the atemporal model as special cases. In the
very long run, the response of the local capital stock to a change in scal policy is precisely
what the atemporal model with freely mobile capital would predict. In the very short run,
the local capital stock is completely xed. Thus, depending on the time horizon, capital
could be described both as perfectly mobile and as perfectly mobile. The form of the
adjustment cost function dictates the speed of adjustment of the capital stock: as the costs
of adjustment rise, the rate of adjustment of the capital stock falls. In the extreme case
where there are no adjustment costs, adjustment is instantaneous and capital is \perfectly
mobile." As adjustment costs rise, the \short run" becomes, eectively, longer and longer,
and the model behaves increasingly like one in which capital is \perfectly immobile."
The fact that capital is not very mobile in the short run means that capital income
can be a target for redistributive policy: the returns to the owners of local capital consist
of quasi-rents that can be captured by local tax or other policies. While such policies do
eventually reduce the net ow of income to the owners of immobile local resources, the
short-run gains are discounted less than the long-run costs. If local policies are chosen in
order to maximize the appropriately-discounted welfare of the owners of local immobile
factors, the optimal local tax on capital is positive, not zero, as the atemporal analysis
would suggest. The lower the costs of adjustment, i.e., the greater the rate at which the
capital stock adjusts, the lower is the optimal rate of tax.
While it is most conventional to use adjustment-cost models to study investment in
non-human capital, they can be applied as well to analyze labor mobility. Suppose, for
example, that rms can increase or decrease the number of high-skilled workers that they
employ, but that they incur costs in doing so, whether implicitly or explicitly. These costs
might include employee moving costs, signing bonuses, severance pay, and on-the-job train-
ing costs. Assume that highly-skilled workers earn a net income of w
h
on external markets.
A mere reinterpretation of the previous model permits one to conclude that highly-skilled
workers earn quasi-rents that could be captured or augmented by redistributive scal poli-
cies.
A somewhat more complex version of the adjustment-cost model would allow for costly
dynamic adjustment with more than one variable factor of production. For example, one
might suppose that the stocks of both capital and highly-skilled labor within a given local
jurisdiction can be adjusted gradually over time { in eect, a dynamic version of the model
16
developed in Section II. The formal analysis of such a model remains to be undertaken. It
seems fairly clear that such an analysis would show that both capital and highly-skilled
labor earn quasi-rents and that redistribution involving either or both of these factors
would aect their net returns in the short run but not in the long run. Their adjustment
dynamics would normally be interdependent, however, which may potentially give rise to
some interesting implications for redistributive policy.
V. Conclusion: Challenges for Fiscal Policy in Europe
The process of economic integration in Europe is unfolding gradually over time. Look-
ing forward over the next half-century or so, demographic change { especially the eects of
low fertility and mortality in auent countries surrounded by lower-wage regions { seems
likely to play a crucial role in the evolution of scal policy. This section discusses several
of the challenges that EU countries are likely to confront over this time horizon.
Migration Policy and Fiscal Policy
Let us begin with the observation that EU labor markets have been magnets for mi-
grants. A rst question for policy is whether and by how much to impede the ow of
population into the EU countries. One might suppose, theoretically, that strict immigra-
tion controls are possible. Indeed, there was little East-West migration during the past
half-century. The low levels of East-West migration during the Cold War, however, must
be attributed in large part not to the anti-immigration policies of the EU countries but
rather to the anti-emigration policies of the Warsaw Pact countries, who exercised sub-
stantial control over their borders and went to considerable lengths to limit emigration.
This experience is unlikely to be repeated. Even if they were disposed to do so, it would
be quite dicult for the countries of the former Warsaw Pact to re-establish the kinds of
economic and police powers that would enable them to impose harsh restrictions on emi-
gration. The EU countries, one may safely assume, will not resort to Draconian measures
to limit immigration. The question, then, is not whether the EU countries will experience
net immigration, but rather at what rate immigration will proceed. In terms of the dy-
namic model described above, policymakers may be able to aect the \adjustment cost
technology" for labor, facilitating immigration and speeding up the adjustment process or
impeding labor mobility and slowing it down.
14
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See Decressin and Fatas (1995) for some empirical analysis of the speed with which
labor markets in EU countries adjust to (temporary) regional shocks. Their study suggests
that interregional labor ows proceed at about half the speed that they do in the US.
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From the welfare viewpoint, there are many advantages to liberalized migration poli-
cies. Most importantly, there are obvious eciency gains to be realized by allowing labor
to be employed productively. Low labor productivity in regions around the EU result from
many factors: low levels of private capital, low levels of public infrastructure, insecure
property rights and ineective legal institutions, including political uncertainty and the
risk of violent conict, obstacles to international trade, and low levels of human capital.
While these conditions persist, real income dierentials will continue to attract labor {
much of it relatively low-skilled { toward more productive employment in the EU. The ag-
ing of the EU labor force may accentuate the eciency gains from migration, as retirement
makes labor within the EU countries increasingly scarce.
One of the principal challenges for policy arises from the distributional impact of mi-
gration. Inows of labor from neighboring countries put downward pressure on wages in
the EU countries, which harms native workers whose labor is substitutable with that of
migrants. Within the context of highly-structured EU labor markets, reductions in real
wages may occur rather slowly, during which time slackness in labor markets is likely to
manifest itself in the form of unemployment. Indeed, immigration may create pressures to
protect the employment and earnings of existing workers, perhaps retarding the procees of
institutional change in the labor market in the short run, even as it undermines the insti-
tutions that support labor market rigidities in the long term.
15
But whether immigration
contributes to lower real wages or to higher unemployment, it worsens the labor-market
environment for existing workers, especially those with fewer skills.
Of course, if there are eciency gains from inter-regional migration, gains to gainers
must exceed losses to losers. Redistribution from gainers to losers in principle provides
a means by which policymakers can oset any adverse distributional eects arising from
increased immigration. Appropriate compensation mechanisms are not easily devised,
however. Most of the obvious forms of compensation { instruments such as means-tested
15
The example of German unication is instructive. As explained by Sinn and Sinn
(1994) and Sinn (1995), the eorts of labor unions and policymakers have succeeded in
extending high real wages into the former East Germany, simultaneously protecting the
real wages of workers in the West and contributing to higher unemployment. For recent
discussions of labor market institutions and the unemployment problem in the EU coun-
tries, see, e.g., Bertolo and Ichino (1995), Burda and Mertens (1995), Siebert (1997), and
Nickell (1997). Schob and Wildasin (1998) analyze the eciency and distributional eects
of labor market integration in a system of jurisdictions with unemployment.
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cash and in-kind benets nanced by taxes on high-income individuals and source-based
capital income taxes { are traditionally oered on a residence basis to all households who
qualify on the basis of income, unemployment, or other criteria.
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If immigrants are
not or cannot be excluded from social benets, then the attempt to compensate those
who are adversely aected by immigration will in itself increase the incentives for further
immigration. Indeed, it can be shown (Wildasin, 1994) that labor market integration will
often not be Pareto-improving for the residents of a given jurisdiction if scal discrimination
between immigrants and native residents is not feasible or is disallowed, even though
aggregate income within the jurisdiction may rise.
Liberalized immigration for the EU countries is therefore likely to be a mixed blessing,
bringing benets to some but not all existing residents.
17
Increased immigration is espe-
cially attractive if migrants are net scal contributors, bearing more in taxes than they
receive in benets. These scal gains are eroded by providing social benets to immigrants,
however, and increased immigration would likely increase the pressure on policymakers to
limit scal expenditures that benet migrants. By the same token, competition creates
incentives for policymakers to limit the scal burdens imposed on migrants, especially
those at the upper end of the income distribution, from whom more substantial scal
contributions might be obtained. Similarly, limitations on the scal benets accorded to
low-skilled, low-income migrants reduces the incentive to restrict immigration.
16
Non-discriminatory scal treatment for citizens of EU member states is guaranteed by
the Treaty of Rome. Furthermore, exclusion frommany types of social benets is infeasible,
even if it is legally permissible. In an interesting recent related development in the US,
a May 1999 Supreme Court decision (Saenz v. Roe) holds that it is unconstitutional for
individual states to delay the extension of welfare benets to poor residents who have
recently arrived from other states, thus constraining further the potential for states to
discriminate in their scal treatment of \natives" and \immigrants." This decision is likely
to attract renewed attention to the issue of the implications of mobility of the poor for
welfare policy and reform in the US; see Peterson and Rom (1990) for policy discussion
and Brueckner (1998) for a recent survey of relevant theoretical and empirical literature
on this subject.
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The magnitudes of both the eciency gains and many of the distributional eects
resulting from labor migration between neighboring countries and the EU depend on the
size of interregional productivity disparities. Issues such as prospective EU enlargement
bring this fact sharply into focus. As discussed by Persson (1995) and Goodspeed (1997),
it is remarkable and perhaps paradoxical that the extent of redistributive policies seems
to be greater when undertaken in a region where income disparities are relatively small.
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Regional Policy
The EU countries as a whole are auent. However, some regions within the EU are
relatively poor. One goal of the EU's structural funds is to promote economic development
in poor regions, or to assist the residents of these regions. The CAP, which helps to
maintain incomes for those in the agricultural sector, should probably also be viewed as
part of the EU's regional policy. The agricultural work force in Europe has been in a
gradual decline, a process that is of course associated with rural-urban migration.
18
The
reallocation of labor from rural agriculture toward urban industry and services has been
the result of intersectoral and interregional real-income dierentials, an adjustment process
that would have proceeded more rapidly in the absence of the CAP (and perhaps other
policies), which has propped up incomes for workers in the rural areas of EU countries.
19
Regional policy for the EU countries, however, involves not only the regions within
existing EU member states, but other neighboring regions as well { the countries of eastern
and southeastern Europe and of North Africa, in particular. Policies dealing with regions
outside the EU are less systematized than for those within, but include trade policy,
migration policy, and economic development policies. One of the main questions of regional
policy in this regard is actually the issue of EU enlargement. Since EU membership entails
free trade and free movement of labor and capital, it oers substantial potential benets
to many of the residents of new member states.
Equity considerations often gure prominently in regional policies. Rich regions typ-
ically transfer resources to poor regions, foreign aid generally ows from rich countries to
poor countries, and sectoral subsidies generally ow to declining rather than to growing
sectors of the economy. A perennial question is whether these policies promote reasonable
economic goals or whether they simply interfere with the ecient functioning of markets.
If a region is subject to adverse demographic, technological, political, economic, or other
factors, is it better to expend resources in developing or simply subsidizing the region or
to facilitate the ow of popuation and capital away from the region?
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Just during the decade 1986{1996, agriculture's share of employment in the EU has
fallen from 7.9% to 5.1% (OECD 1997).
19
The magnitidue of the CAP subsidies varies substantially among countries. As de-
scribed in Baldwin et al. (1997), 1994 CAP expenditures per farmer were as high as 12,290
ecu in Belgium and as little as 1514 ecu per farmer in Portugal, with a mean level of 5621.
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The impact of regional policies is critically dependent on the degree of factor mobility.
Subsidies that promote investment or employment in a region may raise wages there if
workers are immobile. If, on the other hand, workers are interregionally mobile, these
policies will reduce the ow of labor out of the region, beneting owners of land, natural
resources, and long-lived capital, but at a cost in terms of lost opportunities for workers
to move to regions where they could be more productively employed. To consider one
dramatic recent example, consider the Balkan situation. Because of political and military
strife, the EU countries face the dilemma of managing a signicant number of displaced
persons. Current policy discussions focus on the rebuilding of Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia,
and presumably Montenegro and Serbia as well, at the conclusion of military action, in
order to achieve the resettlement of Kosovars in Kosovo. Such a policy is bound to be quite
costly, though necessary to restore the economic health of the region. As an alternative,
one might allow or even facilitate the relocation of refugees to EU countries. The people
of Kosovo are clearly somewhat mobile, and one suspects that many might willingly settle
elsewhere in Europe. Indeed, the ourishing trade in illegal immigrants across the Strait
of Otranto even prior to the outbreak of the recent hostilities evidences the potential for
migration from the Balkans, even in the absence of explicit liberalization of immigration
policy in the EU.
This example highlights the policy tradeos for the EU countries: in the absence of
economic growth and prosperity in neighboring regions, migration pressure is heightened,
making it more dicult to enforce immigration restrictions and exacerbating whatever
diculties immigration poses for the destination countries. One way to promote economic
development of poor regions is through interregional transfers, whether in the form of sim-
ple economic relief, through investment in infrastructure, or through subsidies to private
investment. These transfers, however, impose scal burdens on the donor regions. As an
alternative, greater integration of the markets for labor, capital, and goods and services
may promote more rapid economic development of poor regions and the opportunity for
mobile factors in poor regions to escape to more productive uses elsewhere. This alter-
native, however, may not help the owners of relatively immobile factors of production in
the poor region { landowners, business owners, or older or less-skilled individuals, and it
entails distributional impacts that destination regions might wish to avoid, assuming, as
before, that ideal compensatory redistributive policies are not feasible. Sometimes, in fact,
it can be Pareto-improving for the residents of the destination region { the EU countries,
especially the richer ones { to make scal transfers to poor regions, such as the Balkans,
21
the countries of Eastern Europe, or the countries of North Africa.
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The Dynamics of Political Economy: Exit and Voice
A nal issue that warrants attention is the implications of factor mobility for the
political economy of public policy, especially redistributive scal policies. Returning for
the moment to the atemporal models of scal competition described in Section II, note
that factor mobility carries potentially rather powerful implications for public choice. In
a world where several dierent resources are immobile, the coercive power of the public
sector can be exploited, through the political process, to transfer rents among resource
owners { for examples, from owners of land in the western part of a locality to landowners
in the eastern part, or from immobile rich workers to immobile poor workers. Each of these
groups has an incentive to participate in the political process to exploit the other, and to
defend itself against exploitation by the other. In the language of Hirschman (1970), each
has an incentive to use \voice."
But suppose now that a resource, previously immobile, becomes freely mobile. It is no
longer in the interest of others in the jurisdiction to target this resource as a contributor in
some redistributive mechanism, since it no longer earns rents that can be captured through
scal policy. By the same token, the owners of the now-mobile resource no longer have an
incentive to participate in the local political process since, on the one hand, the benets
of any scal transfers directed toward them would be eroded by inows of competing
resources, and, on the other hand, the burden of any transfers directed against them can
be avoided by leaving { Hirschman's \exit" option. It is perhaps one of the paradoxes of
increasing factor mobility that as politcal power becomes increasingly concentrated in the
hands of immobile factor owners, the value of exercising that power tends to diminish.
More generally, in a more realistic world with imperfect factor mobility, the clear-cut
distinction between \voice" and \exit" becomes blurred. But, even in an explicitly dynamic
model of factor mobility such as that discussed in Section IV, the implications of increased
factor mobility seem reasonably clear. Whether brought about by changes in policy (such
as EU enlargement, relaxation of capital controls and immigration quotas, or the easing
of occupational licensure and related labor market regulations) or through reductions in
the fundamental real costs of factor movement, greater factor mobility reduces adjustment
20
SeeWildasin (1994) for a formal demonstration and Razin and Sadka (1995) for further
discussion.
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costs and raises the speed with which stocks of factors respond to scal incentives. It also
reduces the quasi-rents that owners of these factors can gain or lose through favorable or
adverse manipulation of scal policies. Even as the \voices" arguing for more favorable
scal treatment of capital or highly-skilled young workers become less insistent, scal policy
may become more and more favorable toward them. The locus of political debate may shift
toward disputes among those resources that remain relatively immobile { \landowners in
the east" and \landowners in the west", owners of natural resources and the elderly, and
others whose incomes are directly or indirectly tied to locationally-xed resources.
23
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APPENDIX
This appendix presents an explicit comparative-dynamic analysis of the eects of scal
competition in a world with imperfectly-mobile capital. The imperfect mobility of capital
arises because of the costs of adjustment associated with investment.
A. Model Structure
The analysis focuses on a single small jurisdiction. Within this jurisdiction, capital is
combined with immobile and inelastically-supplied factors of production { called \labor",
but also interpreted to include land, natural resources, public infrastructure, and other
xed inputs { to produce one or more traded goods. Assuming that the prices of traded
goods are unaected by local policies, these goods may be treated as a composite commod-
ity which is taken as numeraire. Thus, let f(k
t
), with f
0
> 0 > f
00
, denote output within
the locality at time t, expressed as a function of the amount of capital employed within the
jurisdiction at that time, k
t
. The strict concavity of f reects the presence of other, xed
factors of production. Assuming that local factor markets are perfectly competitive, these
factors will receive a gross income at time t equal to w
t
 f(k
t
)  k
t
f
0
(k
t
). It is assumed
that these factors are owned by local residents who themselves are immobile and assumed
to be identical. In order to obviate any issues relating to intergenerational transfers, these
households are also assumed to be innitely-lived (or, equivalently, to be linked through
altruistically-motivated intergenerational transfers).
Capital is traded in external markets, where it earns a rate of return r that is unaected
by local policies and is thus taken as exogenously xed for the purposes of the analysis. It is
also assumed to be time-invariant. Firms located within the locality can acquire capital at
a cost of r and also must pay a local tax on capital. In order to keep the analysis of capital
tax policy as simple as possible, and, in particular, to obviate issues of time consistency as
well as to maintain ease of comparison with atemporal models used in previous literature,
assume that the locality imposes a per-unit tax on capital at a time invariant rate of 
k
.
Thus, the tax-inclusive cost of capital to local rms is r + 
k
.
The dynamics of the model are determined largely by adjustment costs that rms
must bear when they undertake local investment; in particular, these costs will preclude
instantaneous adjustment of the local capital stock. Specically, the cost of adjustment
incurred by local rms is given by c(i
t
)k
t
, with c
0
> 0 < c
00
where i
t
is the rate of gross
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investment within the locality at time t, i.e., the amount of expenditures on capital goods
expressed as a proportion of the amount of capital in the locality, k
t
. This adjustment
cost is assumed to take the form of lost output and is thus expressed in units of numeraire.
Note that since c() is homogeneous of degree zero in the level of investment and the
total stock of capital, total adjustment costs are homogeneous of degree one in these
variables. This assumption, and the assumption that adjustment costs are convex in the
rate of investment, are standard ones in the investment literature. Assuming that capital
depreciates at a constant exponential rate of , the evolution of the local capital stock
takes the usual form:
_
k = (i
t
  )k
t
: (A:1)
The cash ow of local rms at time t is the value of their output net of adjustment costs,
less investment expenditures, less tax payments, less payments for local labor,

t
= f(k
t
)   c(i
t
)k
t
  
k
k
t
  i
t
k
t
  w
t
: (A:2)
Assume that no agents face liquidity constraints or other capital market imperfections
and that all agents plan over innite horizons. Local residents are assumed to plan their
lifetime private consumption streams subject to the constraint that the present value of
lifetime consumption is equal to the present value of lifetime income net of any taxes or
transfers, rms maximize the present value of prots net of taxes or subsidies, and the
local government must satisfy a budget constraint that requires the present value of public
expenditures to be equal to the present value of tax revenues. Under these assumptions,
rms choose the paths of investment i
t
and capital k
t
to
max  
Z
1
0

t
e
 rt
dt (P )
subject to (1), with an initially-given stock of capital k
0
= K
0
.
In addition to collecting revenues from the taxation of local capital, the local gov-
ernment may collect revenue from or provide subsidies to local residents in a lump-sum
fashion and it can spend money on the provision of public goods that benet local resi-
dents. Let T denote the present value of lump-sum taxes imposed on local residents; under
the assumptions of the model, the precise time path of revenue ows from these taxes is
unimportant. Assume that the level of provision of public goods is exogenously xed and
let

G denote the present value of public expenditures on public good provision; provided
that public good provision levels are xed, their time path is unimportant. Since the stock
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of capital in the locality can vary over time, the amount of tax revenue collected from
capital taxation can also vary, with t
k
k
t
the amount of revenue collected at time t. The
local government budget constraint requires that

G = T +
Z
1
0

k
k
t
e
 rt
dt: (A:3)
Local residents derive utility from private consumption and from local public goods.
The latter, however, are treated as exogenously xed, and can be ignored in the remainder
of the analysis. No restrictions are placed on the role of public goods in the preference
structure of households. The preferences of households over private consumption streams
can also be very general; essentially all that is required is that household intertemporal
utility maximization exhausts the present-value lifetime budget constraint. This basic
assumption implies that the welfare of local residents is an increasing function of lifetime
wealth. As already noted, households are endowed with xed supplies of labor, earning a
gross return of w
t
= f(k
t
) k
t
f
0
(k
t
) in every period. Local residents may also be endowed
with some stock of capital

k which earns a ow return of r

k in every period, as well as
some ownership shares in local and foreign rms. Let  represent the local ownership share
in local rms, with 0    1, and let

 represent the present value of prots derived from
ownership of rms outside of the locality. Under these assumptions, the present value of
lifetime income for local residents is given by
Y =
Z
1
0
[f(k
t
)   k
t
f
0
(k
t
)] e
 rt
dt+

k +  +

  T: (A:4)
Under the assumptions of the model, local tax policy aects the welfare of local residents
only insofar as it aects Y .
B. Comparative Dynamic Response to Tax Policy: Fundamental Analytics
The local tax on capital 
k
aects the equilibrium stock of capital invested in the
locality. To understand this linkage, it is necessary to analyze the behavior of rms in
greater detail. Specically, forming the current-value Hamiltonian
H
t
 
t
+ 
t
(i
t
  )k
t
;
the necessary conditions for a solution to the prot-maximization problem (P) are
@H
@i
t
= 0 $ 
t
= 1 + c
0
(i
t
) (A:5:1)
 
_
+ r
t
=
@H
@k
t
$  
_
 = (f
0
(k
t
)  c(i
t
) + (
t
  1)i
t
  
k
)  
t
(r + ): (A:5:2)
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By (A.5.1), the prot-maximizing rate of investment is determined implicitly as a function
i
t
= (
t
) with 
0
() = c
00
()
 1
> 0. Substituting into (A.5.2) and dening 	(
t
) 
c([
t
])  c
0
([
t
])(
t
) yields
 
_
 = f
0
(k
t
)  	(
t
)   
k
  
t
(r + ): (A:6)
Equations (A.1) and (A.6) dene a dynamical system in the two variables k
t
and 
t
.
Letting 
1
, k
1
, and i
1
denote steady state values, (A.1) and (A.6) imply that
i
1
 (
1
) =  (A:7:1)
f
0
(k
1
) = 	(
1
) + 
k
+ 
1
(r + ) (A:7:2)
which uniquely determine the steady state of the system.
To see how the local capital stock depends on local taxation, rst derive the variational
equations
d
_
k
d
k
= ((
t
)   )
dk
d
k
+ k
t

0
(
t
)
d
t
d
k
(A:8:1)
d
_

d
k
=  f
00
(k
t
)
dk
d
k
+ (r +  +	
0
(
t
))
d
t
d
k
+ 1 (A:8:2)
from (A.1) and (A.6). These equations, together with the boundary conditions k
0
= K
0
and lim
t!1

t
= 
1
= 
 1
(), provide two linear dierential equations which can be
solved for the functions d
t
=d
k
and dk
t
=d
k
, i.e., for the comparative-dynamic response
of the system to a change in the local rate of taxation on capital.
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In particular, assuming that the locality is initially in a steady-state equilibrium, (A.8)
is a two-equation system with constant coecients. To solve this system, it is convenient
to reduce its dimensionality. Using (A.7.1) in (A.8.1) and noting that 
0
(
1
) = 1=c
00
(),
it follows that d
_
k=d
k
= (k
1
=c
00
()) d
t
=d
k
which can be inverted to solve for
d
t
d
k
=
c
00
()
k
1
d
_
k
t
d
k
(A:9:1)
and hence
21
See Boadway (1979) for a comparative-dynamic tax analysis, in a closed-economy
context, using similar techniques.
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d_

t
d
k
=
c
00
()
k
1
d

k
t
d
k
: (A:9:2)
Noting (as is easily veried) that 	
0
(
1
) =  , substitution from (A.9) into (A.8.2) yields
a second-order dierential equation in dk
t
=d
k
d

k
t
d
k
= r
d
_
k
t
d
k
 
k
1
f
00
c
00
()
dk
t
d
k
+
k
1
c
00
()
(A:10)
with the boundary conditions k
0
= K
0
and lim
t!1
k
t
= k
1
. The characteristic polynomial
for this equation has two distinct real roots, one positive and one negative; one can verify
that the solution to the equation is
dk
t
d
k
=
1
f
00
(k
1
)

1  e
 t

(A:11:1)
where   is the negative root of the characteristic polynomial associated with (A.10),
given by
 =  
r
2
+
p
r
2
  4k
1
f
00
(k
1
)=c
00
()
2
> 0; (A:11:2)
the inequality in (A.12) follows because of the concavity of f and the convexity of c. From
(A.11.1), it follows that
dk
t
d
k
< 0 for all t > 0; (A:12)
that is, an increase in the local tax on capital reduces the capital stock at all subsequent
times. Indeed, the reduction in the capital stock is monotonic, and the magnitude of 
determines the rate at which the capital stock falls to its new, lower, steady-state value.
To facilitate the economic interpretation of (A.11), dene 
t
 f
0
(k
t
)=k
t
dk
t
=d
k
,
which is the percentage change in the stock of capital, at time t, that results from an
increase in the rate of capital taxation by one percent of the gross rate of return (or
marginal product) of capital. Furthermore, dene
 
f
0
(k
1
)
k
1
f
00
(k
1
)
;
 can be interpreted as the \elasticity of demand for capital," i.e., it is the percentage
change in k associated with a one percentage point increase in the marginal product of
capital. If the production function is highly concave, the marginal productivity of capital
schedule is very steep and  is very small; in this case, we expect to see that tax policy
has little eect on the equilibrium level of capital. Indeed, implicit dierentiation of the
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steady-state condition (A.7.2) shows that the proportionate change in the steady-state
value of the capital stock is just equal to

1
 lim
t!1

t
= :
In terms of this notation, (A.11) and (A.12) can be written as

t
= 
1

1  e
 t

= 

1  e
 t

(A:13:1)
where now
 =  
r
2
+
p
r
2
  4f
0
(k
1
)=c
00
()
2
: (A:13:2)
Note from (A.13.2) that the rate of adjustment of the capital stock depends critically
on c
00
(), that is, the second derivative of the adjustment cost function. If the adjustment
cost function is only mildly convex, so that c
00
is close to zero, then  is a large and the
adjustment to the new steady state occurs very quickly. If c
00
is large, however,  is small,
and the adjustment to the steady state is slow.
The principal conclusions of this analysis can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 1: Starting from an initial steady-state equilibrium, a permanent unan-
ticipated increase in the capital tax rate lowers the new steady-state equilibrium capital
stock in proportion to the elasticity of demand for capital. The capital stock falls mono-
tonically to its new steady-state value at a rate that depends positively on the convexity of
the adjustment cost function. In particular, with linear adjustment costs, the adjustment
is instantaneous.
C. The Welfare Analysis of Fiscal Policy with Imperfect Capital Mobility
Having characterized the comparative-dynamic eects of local capital taxes on the
evolution of the capital stock, it is now possible to consider the welfare implications of
capital taxation. In particular, it is of greatest interest to examine the eect of changes in

k
on the welfare of local residents, as represented by their lifetime wealth Y . For brevity,
it is convenient here to restrict attention to the case where local rms are owned entirely
by non-residents, i.e.,  = 0. Substituting from (A.3) into (A.4), one obtains
dY
d
k
=
Z
1
0

 k
1
f
00
(k
1
)
dk
t
d
k
+ 
k
dk
t
d
k
+ k
1

e
 rt
dt
=
Z
1
0

k
1
e
 t
+ 
k
dk
t
d
k

e
 rt
dt (A:14)
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where the second equality follows from (A.11.1).
To interpret (A.14), consider rst the case where 
k
= 0, i.e., the locality initially
raises no taxes from capital. In this case, the second term in the integrand of (A.14)
vanishes, and it is clear that dY=d
k
> 0, that is, it is optimal for the locality to impose
a positive tax on capital. The gain from doing so, however, depends on the value of the
speed of adjustment of the capital stock; the larger the value of , the smaller the gain
from taxing capital. Indeed, in the extreme case of linear adjustment costs, adjustment is
instantaneous, and the gain from local taxation of capital vanishes.
In view of (A.12), it is obvious that local welfare is maximized by choosing a positive
rate of taxation 

k
on local capital such that dY=d
k
= 0. In fact, one can solve for the
rate of capital taxation, expressed as a proportion of the gross return on capital, as

k
f
0
(k
1
)
=
 1

; (A:15)
an inverse-elasticity type of formula in which the rate of adjustment of the capital stock,
, again gures prominently.
Proposition 2: The optimal steady-state rate of taxation of local capital is inversely
proportional to the speed with which the local capital stock adjusts in response to changes
in the local rate of return on capital. In particular, if adjustment is instantaneous, the
optimal local tax rate is zero.
This proposition is helpful in the proper interpretation of previous results from atem-
poral models which abstract from the dynamics of adjustment. When adjustment costs
are negligible, there are no quasi-rents to extract from the owners of local capital, and
no incentive for local governments, acting in the interests of their residents, to impose
scal burdens on this capital. However, if it is costly to adjust the local capital stock, the
owners of this capital, when net scal burdens are imposed on them, will not nd it in
their interest to reduce the capital stock immediately to a level at which it again earns a
competitive net rate of return. Rather, they will allow the capital stock to fall gradually
until it reaches its new steady-state value. During this transition, the net rate of return is
below the level that can be obtained on external markets, and the local capital tax thus
transfers quasi-rents from capital owners to local residents. Thus, a small open locality,
whose policies have no perceptible eect on the net rate of return to capital on external
markets, can achieve some redistribution at the expense of the owners of imperfectly mo-
bile resources even though, in the long run, the net rate of return on local capital must
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return to that which can be obtained on external markets. The redistributive impact of
the local capital tax, however, is dependent on the amount of quasi-rents available to be
captured, which depends on the costs of adjustment. Previous literature, which abstracts
from adjustment costs, in eect assumes that the capital stock is able to adjust to changes
in local scal policies without delay.
While it is true that a locality's residents can benet from taxing imperfectly-mobile
capital, the reduction in the stock of local capital does inevitably reduce the productivity
of local labor, and the steady-state level of wage income is reduced by the taxation of
mobile capital. Taxing imperfectly-mobile capital thus involves an intertemporal tradeo
for local residents: they can enjoy the benets of reduced taxes for local public services,
but gradually their wage income erodes, ultimately by an amount greater than the tax
savings that they obtain by taxing capital. The preceding analysis has shown that the
taxation of local capital is in their interest in present value terms, when discounted at the
market rate of return. However, if the eects of local policy are discounted at a lower
rate, this intertemporal tradeo becomes less favorable. Indeed, if they are not discounted
at all, so that policies are judged only by their long-run eects, the local capital tax is
actually harmful to local residents and should be avoided. This is another way to interpret
the ndings of previous analyses: by ignoring the transitional dynamics of adjustment to
local policies, they have in eect focused on the long-run impacts of scal policy and, in
doing so, have concluded that localities, acting in the interests of their residents, will not
attempt to impose scal burdens on mobile factors of production.
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